Given the content of China’s new national security white paper, Beijing is likely to perceive U.S. tariffs and the cancellation of student visas as ideological attacks on its political system, not just policy decisions.
There is concern China will retaliate with countermeasures such as cyberattacks, sanctions, or crackdowns on U.S.-linked entities in China.
This from thegatewaypundit.com.
The Chinese Communist Party’s newly released national security white paper asserts security is essential to development and openness, and warns against foreign interference and ideological threats. The document emphasizes rule of law with “Chinese characteristics” and reaffirms the Party’s zero tolerance for external pressure or attempts to undermine its political system.
In this context, “external threats” almost always refer to the United States, signaling that China views U.S. resistance to its effort to reshape the international order as a direct challenge to its security.
The new white paper, China’s National Security in the New Era, roots Xi Jinping’s concept of comprehensive national security in 5,000 years of Chinese civilization and strategic culture. Unlike the U.S., which regularly issues national security strategies, this is China’s first official attempt to define a unified framework, possibly foreshadowing an internal five-year plan for 2026–2031.
This shift in planning and public messaging suggests the PRC is signaling a heightened sense of urgency, possibly indicating that preparations for a future conflict over Taiwan, or even direct confrontation with the United States, are moving closer to a predetermined timeline.
For over a decade, China has viewed U.S.-led multinational security alliances, especially NATO (a defense alliance) and newer coalitions like AUKUS (Australia, the UK, and the U.S.) and the Quad (the U.S., Japan, Australia, and India)—with suspicion and likely envy. Beijing is deepening ties with pariah states such as Afghanistan, Russia, and Iran, but it maintains only one formal defense treaty—with North Korea. In contrast, the new white paper promotes the PRC’s Global Security Initiative (GSI) as an alternative to Western frameworks. Introduced by Xi Jinping in 2023, the GSI outlines China’s vision for reshaping global security governance by rejecting bloc politics, unilateralism, and Cold War thinking.
Ironically, while accusing the U.S. of forming exclusive blocs, Beijing portrays its own initiatives, GSI, Belt and Road, BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and partnerships with adversaries like Russia and Iran, as inclusive and rule-based.
Beijing also claims the GSI positions China as a stabilizing force:
– encouraging bilateral and multilateral cooperation, especially in the Global South, and
– calling for peaceful conflict resolution, major power restraint, and enhanced global collaboration on climate, cybersecurity, and non-proliferation.
In reality:
[T]he GSI is a first step toward
forming a Beijing-led equivalent of NATO.
A multilateral cooperation whose weapons would ultimately be aimed at the United States. However, China struggles to build true alliances due to widespread mistrust and its numerous territorial disputes. While many nations have welcomed Chinese investment, trade, and development loans, few are willing to enter into binding security arrangements. Security agreements remain a lower tier than defense pacts, and even China’s closest economic partners, such as Cambodia, Laos, and several African states—have refused to sign defense cooperation agreements that might include aid or joint training.
Still, the global landscape is fluid, and Xi Jinping hopes these softer arrangements will evolve into full-fledged defense alliances. Yet, he remains pragmatic. A defense pact with Afghanistan could entangle China in regional instability, while one with Pakistan risks direct conflict with India or jeopardizing trade ties. For these reasons, GSI may ultimately prove to be a short-lived effort, much like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization or the now-diminished Belt and Road Initiative. Nonetheless, the GSI remains a development the United States must monitor closely.
A central theme of the white paper is the elevation of political security, defined as safeguarding the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) leadership and the socialist system—as the “lifeline” of national security:
– Internally, this justifies intensified surveillance, censorship, and repression of civil society, religious groups, and any perceived opposition, and
– Externally, the concept blurs the line between foreign policy and domestic stability, as the CCP views Western democratic values, civil liberties advocacy, and even academic exchanges as potential channels of ideological infiltration.
Under the framework outlined in China’s new national security white paper, U.S. tariffs and the cancellation of Chinese student visas are unlikely to be viewed as routine policy decisions. Instead, they will be interpreted as deliberate threats to China’s political security and national sovereignty. Similarly, restricting student visas—particularly for those in advanced science and technology fields—will be framed as an attempt to block China’s access to knowledge, isolate it internationally, and prevent ideological infiltration. As a result, Beijing may respond not just economically or diplomatically.
